Scenarios 2027 / Scenarios
Rated at Standard Severe. Likelihood type: idiosyncratic. Source of scores: ginc-desk-v0.2.
The count is slow in two provinces and that is enough. By midnight, a video of ballots in a van has twelve million views; by morning it has been debunked and the debunking has a tenth of the reach. The losing side declares the result stolen before it is declared. Protests begin as a vigil and become an occupation. The police commissioner in the capital resigns rather than clear the square; two regional commanders announce they will 'protect the constitution', without saying which side that puts them on. The constitutional court annuls the first round on the strength of an intelligence report about foreign-funded influencers; half the country reads this as rescue and half as coup. Foreign accounts amplify both halves. Investors move first: the currency falls 15 per cent and the bond auction is cancelled. The civil service keeps the lights on for a while, then starts asking who is authorised to sign. Six months later there is a new government, a boycotted parliament and an electoral commission that no one trusts to run the next vote. The country's capability has not changed on paper. Its ability to use it has.
The dateline is illustrative, not a forecast. The narrative is hypothetical; the historical anchors below are real events.
A contested election, court ruling, succession or austerity decision tips into a crisis of legitimacy: sustained disinformation and foreign interference, mass protest, fracture in the security forces, and institutional trust falling below the level at which the state can act. The scenario reworks v0.1's 'foreign interference and information collapse' to include the internal-order dimension that 2024–2025 made unavoidable: annulled elections, governments toppled by youth-led protest, and (per CFR's 2026 survey) political violence in the United States rated a top-tier contingency.
| Event | Date | What happened | Calibrates |
|---|---|---|---|
| Romania's annulled presidential election | 6 December 2024 | Constitutional Court annulled the first round over foreign interference findings | interference and judicial response |
| Bangladesh | July–August 2024 | Student protests toppled the government; prime minister fled on 5 August | protest-driven collapse |
| Nepal | September 2025 | Youth-led protests; prime minister resigned within days | speed of collapse |
| Madagascar | 14 October 2025 | Military took power after weeks of protest; president fled | security-force fracture |
| United States Capitol | 6 January 2021 | Contested certification; violent intrusion | advanced-democracy variant |
| Brasília | 8 January 2023 | Attack on government buildings after a disputed result | advanced-democracy variant |
| CFR Preventive Priorities Survey 2026 | December 2025 | Political violence and civil unrest in the US among five Tier I contingencies; 28 of 30 scenarios rated at least 50 per cent likely | expert likelihood |
Shown at their preset values. Parameters are not adjustable in this release and nothing on this page is computed from them. Custom settings run (Phase B) but are labelled 'non-standard run' and excluded from comparisons.
| Parameter | Default | Range or options | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
| Trigger | contested election | options: court ruling / succession / austerity / corruption revelation | — |
| Trust threshold breached | trust in government below 25 per cent | 20–35 | — |
| Security-force cohesion | fractured | options: loyal / defecting | — |
| Foreign interference intensity | high | low–high | — |
| Duration to new settlement | 9 months | 3–24 | — |
| Violence level | sporadic | — | Sustained at Extreme |
High: capability band shifts expected under current plans. Medium: band shifts under 'none' policy response only. Low: strain without band shift. Loads are judgement-based until the Atlas connects. Domains link to the Atlas.
| Domain | Load | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Hard | ||
| Defence and security | High | internal security, civil–military relations |
| Strategic infrastructure | Low | protest disruption of transport and energy |
| Critical technology | Medium | platform governance; electoral cyber security |
| Soft | ||
| Government effectiveness | High | electoral administration, rule of law, continuity of government |
| Human capital | Medium | emigration of professionals; education disruption |
| Influence and cohesion | High | information integrity, social cohesion, international standing |
| Economic | ||
| Macro-financial | High | capital flight, funding costs |
| Industry, trade and supply | Low | strikes and disruption |
| Energy and resources | Low | subsidy politics |
| Region | Exposure | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| North America | Medium | CFR Tier I |
| Europe | Medium | Romania, Georgia, Serbia precedents |
| China | Low | Different pathway |
| Indo-Pacific | Medium | — |
| South Asia | High | Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka |
| Gulf and Middle East | Medium | — |
| Africa | High | Coups and protest-driven collapses |
| Latin America and Caribbean | High | Peru, Bolivia, Venezuela, Ecuador |
| Russia and Eurasia | Medium | Georgia, Armenia, Belarus |
| Indicator | Source | Threshold |
|---|---|---|
| ACLED protest and riot counts | — | — |
| Edelman and OECD trust surveys | — | — |
| V-Dem electoral democracy index changes | — | — |
| Electoral commission independence ratings | — | — |
| Coordinated inauthentic behaviour takedowns | — | — |
| Internet shutdown counts | Access Now | — |
| Security-force statements | — | — |
| Sovereign CDS around electoral dates | — | — |
From the GINC 250: trends rated Very high or Critical for this scenario. All S07 trend scores.
| Rating | Band or level | Why |
|---|---|---|
| Likelihood, two years | 4Likely | Five to eight governments a year fell to protest or coup in 2024–2025 across 197 nations, and contested elections short of collapse are more frequent still. |
| Likelihood, ten years | 5Highly likely | — |
| Systemic impact | 2Moderate | Unless the nation is a great power. |
| National impact | 5Catastrophic | Capability becomes unusable. |
| Confidence | medium | Definitions of 'crisis' vary. |
Source of scores: ginc-desk-v0.2. Confidence refers to the rating, not the scenario. Calibration sources are listed with the anchors above and on the methodology page.
Contested assumptions for the panel to resolve.
No signed commentary in this build.
0.2.0 · active0.2.0 · 2 October 2026 · Entered the Library at v0.2 with GINC desk scores.GINC (2027). Scenario S07 Political legitimacy crisis, Scenario Library v0.2. scenarios.ginc.org/library/political-legitimacy-crisisContent and data are published under CC BY 4.0.